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on Female-Headed Households 
Paul A. Smith 
OVERVIEW 
As the nation's largest cash welfare program, Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), is replaced 
by state welfare programs funded by federal block 
grants, the effects of reforms on the welfare-
participation and labor-supply choices of low-income 
individuals remain a topic of considerable interest. This 
dissertation uses two different approaches to analyze 
the effects of changes in welfare-program benefit 
formulas and eligibility lUles on the economic well-
being of and the choices made by low-income 
individuals. 
Empirical evidence of the effects of such changes is 
available from the 1981 AFDC reforms, which sought 
to reduce caseloads by restricting limits on earnings and 
assets. The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(OBRA81), designed to reign in the explosive growth in 
caseloads that had occurred over the previous decade, 
dramatically altered the treatment of earnings and assets 
in the AFDC program. The 1981 Act eliminated the 
disregard of one-third of earnings after four months of 
work, capped the disregards given by caseworkers for 
work expenses and child-care expenses, and imposed 
new eligibility restrictions. OBRA81 denied eligibility 
to families whose pre-disregard income was over 150 
percent of the state need standard and imposed a new 
asset limit of $1,000 per family. The overall result of 
these changes was that drastically fewer recipients 
could maintain eligibility while working, and hence the 
work disincentive for AFDC recipients was 
significantly increased. 
Current state temporary assistance for needy 
families (TANF) proposals to expand earnings 
disregards and asset limits would directly reverse 
several of the federal regulations implemented under 
the 1981 Act. This dissel1ation presents an analysis of 
the effects of the 1981 welfare reforms on female-
headed households with children. 
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CHAPTERl 
Chapter 1 investigates differences in demographics, 
income and poverty, labor supply, and multiple 
welfare-program participation among all female-
headed households, AFDC participants, 
nonparticipants, new AFDC entrants, and recentAFDC 
exiters, from 1975 to 1987. The results confirm that the 
population of female-headed households with children 
is economically quite disadvantaged, with an average 
real total annual income of $21,000 (in constant 1994 
dollars), average earnings of only $11,000, and an in-
or-near poverty rate of 50 percent. Moreover, AFDC 
participants are far more likely to be seriously 
economically disadvantaged than nonparticipants. 
Among AFDC participants, average total income is 
only $11,000, average earnings are only $2,600 and the 
in-or-near poverty rate is 88 percent, while among 
nonparticipants the average total income is $25,000, 
average earnings are only $14,000, and the in-or-near 
poverty rate is 36 percent. 
After 1981, the average annual AFDC benefit fell 28 
percent from $5,600 to $4,000, the average total 
income of AFDC participants fell by 19 percent from 
$12,000 to $9,700, and the percentage of households in 
poverty rose from 66 to 80 percent. In contrast, the real 
incomes of nonparticipants stayed roughly constant 
over the 1975-1987 period. In addition, new AFDC 
entrants after 1981 were more disadvantaged than 
entrants before 1981. Their AFDC grants were an 
average of 34 percent lower, earnings were 10 percent 
lower, total income was 12 percent lower, and their 
poverty rate was substantially higher. In contrast, the 
population of AFDC exiters after 1981 was at a level of 
economic well-being that was roughly equal to the 
analogous population before 1981, with the exception 
that exiters after 1981 had earnings that were 26 
percent higher than those exiting before 1981. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The results from Chapter 1 suggest a change in the 
composition of the caseload of AFDC participants, with 
participants after 1981 likely to be even more 
disadvantaged than AFDC participants before 1981. 
Chapter 2 uses a simple nonparametric approach to 
estimate the effects of the 1981 welfare reforms on 
AFDC participation, entry and exit rates, spell lengths, 
eligibility rates, and participation rates among eligibles. 
The results showed striking differences between white 
and nonwhite households. Among white households, 
the probability of AFDC participation increased from 
20 to 22 pcrcent after 1981, while among nonwhite 
households it decreased from 42 to 35 percent. The 
probability of AFDC entry decreased for both groups, 
but thc drop was much larger among nonwhite families 
(from 12 to 7 percent of previous-year nonparticipants, 
compared to a drop tj'om 6 to 5 pcrcent for white 
households). Similarly, the one-year exit rate from 
AFDC increased for white households, from 28 to 30 
percent of participants, while it decreased for nonwhite 
households, from 27 to 23 percent. These patterns of 
strong negative effects on the participation of nonwhite 
households and weaker positive effects among white 
households continuc even after conditioning separately 
on age, education, and family size. 
The results suggest that, at least among nonwhite 
households, AFDC participation became increasingly 
concentrated in the lower tail of the potential-earnings 
distribution. Although not statistically significant, 
some evidence was also found that AFDC spell lengths 
increased somewhat after 1981, consistent with a 
change in the composition of the AFDC caseload 
toward less-skilled, lower earning households. 
AFDC eligibility rates among female-headed 
households declined significantly after 1981, even after 
conditioning separately on age, education, race, and 
family size. Because eligibility is based on earnings 
and assets and is hence essentially endogenous, this 
result shows little evidence of households dramatically 
reducing labor supply or divesting assets in order to 
retain eligibility. This is also consistent with an 
increasing concentration of participants in the lower tail 
of the potential-earnings distribution. 
Finally, AFDC participation rates conditional on 
eligibility increased significantly after 1981, suggesting 
that rather than discouraging participation among 
eligibles, the lower benefits and tighter eligibility 
standards imposed in 1981 refocused participation onto 
the households most likely to find that the benefits of 
AFDC participation outweighed the costs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Chapter 3 develops a formal structural discrete-
choice model to estimate utility parameters underlying 
individual work and welfare choices. Estimates are 
derived from a discrete-choice model in which female 
heads choose among six welfare/work combinations: 
on versus off welfare, together with zero, half-time, or 
full-time work. The estimation is complicated by kinks 
in the budget constraint that arise from the loss of 
welfare benefits at higher income levels, the interaction 
of the AFDC and Food Stamps programs, and the 
progressivity of the federal tax system. 
Since the joint work/welfare choice affects the shape 
of the budget constraint, two budget constraints must be 
evaluated for each household, one with AFDC benefits 
and one without. The discrete-choice approach to 
modeling labor supply simplifies this problem 
considerably, since it reduces the number of points at 
which each budget constraint must be evaluated. This 
approach avoids the need to calculate the location of 
each kink point for the two budget constraints faced by 
each household. Furthermore, discretizing the labor-
supply decision allows the problem to be cast as a 
standard discrete-choice problem with different work! 
welfare combinations as alternatives. A cost of this 
discrete-choice approach is the inability to capture 
marginal changes in labor supply that may occur as a 
result of welfare. 
A problem faced by recent structural studies of work 
and welfare is the lack of a tractable analytic solution to 
the welfare/work choice problem characterized by 
heterogeneity in preferences. Revealed-preference 
inequalities in the model specified here arc solved 
analytically, and the model is estimated with standard 
maximum-likelihood techniques. 
The model is estimated on a sample of 2,462 PSID 
female heads-of-household over the years 1978 to 
1984. The changes imposed by the 1981 OBRA are 
accounted for explicitly in the budget set, as are 
changes in the federal tax system and the interaction of 
AFDC and Food Stamps. Also accounted for is a 
concurrent erosion in real benefit levels that occurred as 
states failed to increase benefits at the rate of inflation. 
Once estimated, parameters are substituted into the 
utility function to predict the response of each 
individual in the sample to a new policy environment. 
This technique is uscd to disentangle the multiple 
effects of the 1981 reforms and to predict responses to 
new policy changes. 
The findings show that the higher benefit-reduction 
rate imposed by OBRA81 had a large negative effect on 
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labor-force participation among AFDC recipients. 
Restricted eligibility rules had little effect on 
participants but a positive effect on the labor supply of 
women newly ineligible for AFDC. Eroding real 
benefit standards had a large negative effect on AFDC 
participation, resulting in a large positive effect on the 
labor supply of women leaving AFDC. 
Estimated utility parameters were also used to 
simulate the effects of hypothetical policy changes. 
AFDC participation and labor-supply choices were 
predicted to be unresponsive to changes in needs 
standards. However, both choices were responsive to 
changes in payment standards. Higher wages 
decreased AFDC participation, resulting in a large 
effect on the labor supply of AFDC exiters. But the 
effect of higher wages on the labor supply of recipients 
was predicted to be small, at least in the absence of 
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higher disregards to match the higher earnings. The net 
effect of higher wages was to increase the labor supply 
among female heads. 
Perhaps most relevant for states considering new 
reforms is the prediction that manipulation of the 
benefit-reduction rate induces significant, offsetting 
changes in both AFDC participation and work effort by 
recipients. Lower benefit-reduction rates encourage 
work effort among recipients, but much of this work 
effort comes from new women drawn onto the rolls 
who would have worked even more off of AFDC. 
Accounting for this effect on labor supply, the net 
response of aggregate labor supply of female heads to 
the benefit-reduction rate is small. Finally, lower 
benefit-reduction rates also significantly increase 
expenditures on benefits, as more women move onto 
AFDC. 
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